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On 19 July 1967, a Piedmont Aviation, Inc., Boeing 727 aircraft was
involved in a mid-air collision with a Cessna aircraft owned by Lanseair,
Inc., and co-operated and co-maintained by Rapidair, Inc. The plaintiff is
the personal representative of the heirs of thirteen passengers killed on the
Piedmont aircraft. For the purposes of this action, Lanseair and Rapidair
were considered as a single business activity and were combined as one
defendant. These corporations in conjunction with Piedmont were the prin-
cipal defendants in the present action. Also joined as defendants in the
action were the Boeing Company for designing the 727 cockpit in such a
manner as to unreasonably restrict the pilot's field of vision, and the United
States of America for negligent operation of an Air Traffic Control Center
by employees who failed to issue proper information, instructions, and
clearances. The complaint filed in New York, a Federal District Court,
averred that the concurrent negligence of all the defendants caused the
collision and subsequent crash. At defendants request the case was trans-
ferred to a North Carolina Federal District Court to be joined with other
actions arising out of the same accident. The plaintiff asserted that the
transfer would negate his capacity to sue since he was unable to comply
with the applicable North Carolina statute' regarding qualification to sue
as a decedent's representative. The remedy sought on appeal was a Writ
of Mandamus to vacate the district court's order transferring the action
under 1404 (a) 2 of the Judical Code [Code]. Held, writ denied: When an
action which meets the requirements of jurisdiction2 and venue4 is instituted
in federal court, a subsequent transfer of that action for "the convenience
of the parties" and "in the interest of justice" will not affect the plaintiff's
capacity to sue regardless of the local law of the transferee forum. Farrell
v. Wyatt, 408 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1969).
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ACTION
Analysis of this action is best accomplished after reviewing proceedings
undertaken by the same plaintiffs and defendants which predated this
'N. C. Gen. Stat. sec 28-8(2) (1905).
2 28 U.S.C. 1404 (a) (1966); 408 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1969).
328 U.S.C. 1331 (1952), 1331 (1964).
428 U.S.C. 1391 (1963).
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appeal and which involved procedural issues pertaining to the transfer.
The line of decisions rendered on causes presented by these parties are re-
ported in four separate opinions, viz. from two district courts and from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.'
To enable the heirs of the deceased parties to proceed with their suit in a
New York federal court, Farrell, a New York citizen, was appointed
administrator of the decedents' estates. Utilizing Farrell's citizenship to
establish the proper venue,' the first action was instituted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Diversity
jurisdiction was established as to all five defendants, as none were resi-
dents of New York. The initial action involved three major issues: (1)
Generally, federal jurisdiction over all the defendants, (2) specifically,
jurisdiction of the New York federal court over Lanseair and Rapidair;
and (3) finally, the critical issue of transfer to a forum where state law
prohibits continuation of the suit by the plaintiff.
In deciding the first issue of overall federal jurisdiction the court noted
that the defendants, Lanseair and Rapidair, were Missouri corporations
with their principal place of business in Missouri. In an attempt to clothe
the New York Federal Court with jurisdiction over the person of these
two defendants, the plaintiff initiated two methods of attaining jurisdic-
tion. First, the plaintiff secured an attachment of Rapidair's aircraft lia-
bility insurance policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York
to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. Service of process was issued to Rapidair
in Missouri pursuant to this attachment. Secondly, in an attempt to obtain
in personam jurisdiction over Lanseair, personal service of process was
executed on the president of Lanseair. Since this officer had made several
trips to New York to secure multiple contractual arrangements with New
York companies, the second method of service was based on the New York
"long arm" statute " as allowed under the doctrine of substantial contacts
espoused in International Shoe' and McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.' The trial court then proceeded to the next defendant and found that
jurisdiction over the claim against the United States for the alleged negli-
gent act of its employee was based on 1346(b) of the Code and the pres-
ence of a federal question. Other applicable statutes for recovery against
the United States were based on the Federal Tort Claims Procedure Act;1'
however, no specific procedural problem arose with regard to this defen-
dant. Next, jurisdiction over the person with respect to Boeing and Pied-
mont in the New York court presented no problem which necessitated
further analysis by the court.
5295 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 408 F2d 662 (2d Cir. 1969); 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 840 (1969); 10 Av. Cas. 18, 358 (W.D.N.C. 1969).628 U.S.C. 1391 (a) (1963) which provides, "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded
only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside."
6A N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules sec. 302 (a) (1) (1966).
'International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
928 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1966).
'28 U.S.C. 2671-2680.
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In reaching a decision on the second issue, i.e., jurisdiction over the per-
son with respect to Lanseair and Rapidair, the district court reviewed New
York caselaw concerning the attachment of a liability insurance policy is-
sued by a foreign insuror doing business in New York 1 as a basis for allow-
ing out-of-state service of process. The court concluded that the primary
prerequisite for allowing an attachment under the authority of Seider v.
Rotb,5' New York's landmark case allowing out-of-state service, was the
facts must indicate that the party for whose benefit the action was under-
taken is a New York citizen. This single element must be present to sustain
such an attempt at quasi in rem jurisdiction. Here the court looked beyond
the citizenship of the administrator to that of the heirs, the real parties
in interest, none of whom were New York residents. The result of these
findings pointed out the necessity of vacating the attachment, setting aside
service based on quasi in rem jurisdiction, and dismissing the action pur-
suant to Rapidair's motion under Rule 12 (b) (2) ." This initial opinion did
not deal with the in personam jurisdiction question of Lanseair; therefore,
as to this issue, these parties remain before the New York federal district
court.
The third, and possibly most critical issue presented in the initial action,
was the New York court's order granting a motion to transfer the entire
action to North Carolina. This motion was presented to the court by the
United States "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice." 4 The reason for the motion was to consolidate this
action with sixty-one additional actions pending in North Carolina federal
district court involving identical facts. The court stated that "[e] very
consideration of convenience and efficiency suggests that all litigation
arising from this tragic disaster should be concentrated in one district....
It would be wasteful judicial administration for judges in two or more
districts to be occupied at the same time by the same problems of fact and
law." In opposition, the plaintiff contended that the effect of such transfer
would be to deprive him of a forum in which to continue suit. The basis
for this contention was that North Carolina law 6 disqualifies non-residents
as administrators, and that the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins' forces the
federal court to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. The
plaintiff also relied on Hoffman v. Blaski8 for a definition of the phrase
" Seider v. Rol, 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1966).
12 Id.
's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (2); The second appellate opinion is significant only in that it affirms
the district court's interpretation of Seider. The final effect of the decision of the second circuit
on this issue is to verify that attachment in New York state to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction is
available only to parties who will benefit from the action, with the added requirement that they be
New York residents. Certiorari has been recently denied the plaintiff on this issue by the Supreme
Court. 396 U.S. 840 (1969). Therefore, non-residents may not use this technique, for even though
residency of the administrator is sufficient to grant New York Courts proper venue, it is insufficient
to allow the procedure of attachment to obtain jurisdiction.
'428 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1966).
15 295 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 28-8(2) (1905).
"'Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
[Vol. 36
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
"where it [the action] might have been brought"'" and argued that either
Erie policy or Hoffman should by themselves or in combination prevent
the transfer to North Carolina. However, relying on VanDusen v. Bar-
rack" as the controlling law, the court refused to recognize the plaintiff's
position and transferred the action.
The instant case involves the plaintiff's request for mandamus from the
Second Circuit seeking to vacate the transfer to a forum whose state law
negates the personal representative's capacity to sue thereby generating a
problem of proper application of federal law.
II. LEGAL EFFECT OF A FEDERAL TRANSFER ORDER
An order transferring a civil action to "any other district or division
where it might have been brought" can be made under 1404 (a) of the
Code. The plaintiff's first issue concerned the final phrase of section
1404 (a) that the transferee forum was not a district where this action
could have been brought initially. In support of this point, the plaintiff
looked to Hoffman v. Blaski2 for a definitive answer to the problem of
where an action may be instituted. In Hoffman the Supreme Court pro-
vided that, "[i]f when a suit is commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in
that district, independently of the wishes of the defendant, it is a district
'where [the action] might have been brought'. If he does not have that
right ... it is not a district 'where it might have been brought'. .*..,. The
plaintiff averred that Hoffman applied to the instant case in this respect,
and that in light of the applicable North Carolina statute," the court is
precluded from transferring to a district where suit could not have begun
at the outset.
In addition to Hoffman, the plaintiff referred to North Carolina's gen-
eral statutes which provide that, "[t]he clerk shall not issue letters of
administration.., to any person... who is a nonresident of this state ......
State case law establishing precedent to the early 1900's utilizes the above
statute to deny capacity to sue.2" It should be pointed out that statutes of
this type are not confined to North Carolina, but are predominate in most
state laws." At first glance this argument of lack of capacity as a result of
Hoffman and statutory law indicates that, in all cases displaying similar
facts to those presented to the federal court in the instant case, the court
would automatically be precluded from transferring the action. However,
because of the limitation thereby placed on the federal court, and the
possibility of encouraging forum shopping by plaintiffs utilizing "con-
structed jurisdiction," the court rendered a negative judgment relying on
more recent case law.26
928 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1966).
20Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
21363 U.S. 335 (1960).
22 Id. at 344.
2N.C. Gen. Star. sec. 28-8(2) (1905).
" Hall v. Southern R.R., 59 S.E. 879 (1907).
21 See generally the applicable laws of Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah.
'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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The trial court ruled that the plaintiff's assertion that Hoffman and the
North Carolina statute negated the right to bring suit in the transferee
forum was incorrect. The basis for this finding was Van Dusen v. Barrack7
where the court held that " 'where it might have been brought' must be
construed with reference to the federal laws delimiting the districts in
which an action 'may be brought' and not with reference to laws of the
transferee state concerning the capacity of fiduciaries to bring suit."' 8
Van Dusen did not present an entirely new procedure, for an identical
question had been previously presented to a court of appeals in Headrick
v. Atchison;" its opinion established the same guidelines as those announced
by the Supreme Court in Van Dusen.'
To quiet arguments that Rule 17 (b) 1 would invalidate the application
of Van Dusen, the Supreme Court held in that case that:
We think it is clear that the Rule's reference to the State 'in which the district
court is held' was intended to achieve the same basic uniformity between state
and federal courts as was intended by the decisions which have formulated the
Erie policy .... Where a section 1404(a) transfer is thus held not to effect a
change of law but essentially only to authorize a change of courtrooms, the
reference in Rule 17(b) to the law of the State 'in which the district court
is held' should be applied in a corresponding manner so that it will refer to the
district court which sits in the State that will generally be the source of
applicable laws."
It is recognized that today one duty of the Supreme Court is to interpret
the application of the federal rules." Here the Court merely redirected the
emphasis of Rule 17(b) in order to alleviate the subtle dichotomy that
existed between its holding in Van Dusen and the Rule.
The court of appeals, in the instant case, was confronted with the plani-
tiff's interpretation of Van Dusen. The plaintiff averred that Van Dusen
would require the transferor forum, New York, to apply its state law, i.e.,
its choice of law rule to determine the plaintiff's capacity to sue in North
Carolina. The court denied the effect of this argument and held that be-
cause the plaintiff had qualified under New York law,'4 that state law
governs the determination of jurisdiction and venue but federal law and
not that of New York applies to determining the substantive law of the
transferee court. Van Dusen applies only to the substantive law of the state
where the action was first instituted. Under this authority the federal court
sitting in North Carolina is required to apply the law of New York as to
the plaintiff's capacity and in turn disregard the law of the transferee state.
2
7 id. 31 J. Air L. & Com. 160 (1965).
"8 Id. at 624.
29 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
So Id.
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides, "The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a
representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. . . . In
all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the
district court is held.
2 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 642-643 (1964).
"328 U.S.C. 2071; 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1966).
"4N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law sec. 5-4.1 (1969).
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To resolve the apparent inconsistency between Van Dusen and Hoffman,
the court pointed out that Hoffman applies to jurisdiction and venue,
whereas Van Dusen concerns only matters of substance, and that each case
must be applied in its proper perspective to avoid procedural confusion.
It should be noted here that Van Dusen is not attempting to disregard
the application of Erie, but instead presents a modification of the Erie Doc-
trine "in the interest of justice."'" To prevent the injustice of depriving the
plaintiff of a forum, the law of the case should be established in the court
where proper jurisdcition and venue were first acquired. To allow the
defendant the added tool of the substantive law of the transferee forum,
would, in many cases requiring specific qualifications to sue, deprive the
plaintiff of a forum. Where the transferor court has refused to hear the
case because the witnesses and parties are elsewhere, and a fortiori the trans-
feree court under Erie would necessarily deny the action for lack of capa-
city, a prima facie case exists for the Van Dusen modification "in the
interest of justice."
The legal effect of the transfer order under Van Dusen. is to modify the
Erie Doctrine by allowing the law of the case to be established under the
state law controlling the federal court where proper jurisdiction and venue
were acquired. Any subsequent transfer of this action will require the
substantive law of the transferor forum to travel to the transferee court
for application. Under this doctrine the plaintiff may continue to select
the forum most beneficial to his cause in regard to amount and method
of recovery, method of payment, and capacity to sue.
III. PROCEDURE FOR TRANSFERsA
The action here appealed from might have been ineligible for transfer
had all of the jurisdictional issues presented been decided at the trial court
" The impact of Erie today does not rest on the facts of the case and should be considered as a
Federal policy of judicial administration.
1A The transfer of an action is in effect only a change of courtrooms to a forum where the
convenience of the parties or the interest of justice may be better served. After the plaintiff has
elected his forum, the burden is on the defendant to show why the forum should be changed. It has
been held that ". . . unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed." Crawford Transport v. Chrysler, 191 F. Supp. 223 (E. D. Ken.
1961). This viewpoint has been reiterated many times by all the circuits except in the situation
where the trial court detects the possibility of forum shopping. U.S. v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp.
709 (E. D. Wash. & Nev. 1962); 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), dismissed 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1966) is based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. "It was drafted
in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens permitting transfer to a more convenient
forum, even though venue is proper." H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. A 132 (1949).
Prior to the adoption of this section the federal courts were powerless to transfer any action to a
more convenient forum; their single recourse was to dismiss the action utilizing forum non con-
veniens. U.S. v. National City Van Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
The proper procedure to initiate a transfer order is by motion from either the defendant or the
plaintiff. Opinion has been voiced that the plaintiff should be denied the right to this procedure
as he began the action in the forum of his choosing. Trader v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 190 F. Supp.
282 (E.D. Pa 1961). Although this viewpoint has only been voiced on one occasion, the opposite
and generally most accepted authority is that announced in Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 286
F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 366 U.S. 948 (1961), which provides that both parties may
initiate the motion. Although no specific time limit is established for making the motion for
transfer, it should be made whenever it becomes apparent that the "interest of justice" requires
such action. Dill v. Scuka, 198 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1961). The fact that any defendant may
present this motion to the court is undisputed. In the instant case the United States initiated the
1970]
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level rather than requiring additional litigation in the transferee forum for
the decision. However, in the instant case the trial court was somewhat
handicapped by the withdrawal of a motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction by Lanseair. The motion was "withdrawn by Lanseair's counsel
upon a stipulation of plaintiffs' counsel that the motion could be withdrawn
without prejudice to renew the motion at a subsequent time. . . ."' It was
not until after the trial court had transferred the action to North Carolina
that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person was
reinstituted.
Section 1404 (a) presupposes that the original trial court found both
jurisdiction over the person and proper venue.' Returning to the facts in
the original action, two attempts to achieve jurisdiction over Lanseair and
Rapidair were made. The quasi in rem jurisdiction was nullified by both
the trial court and the appellate court. However, because the motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person was withdrawn, the trial
court was unable to rule on the personal service on the president of Lanseair
to gain the necessary in personam jurisdiction. Therefore, it seems that
even though jurisdiction is a prerequisite to transfer, the lack of a determi-
nation on jurisdiction will not bar the transfer as the initial forum cannot
sue sponte rebut the presumption that the necessary jurisdiction over the
person exists. 8 Moreover, as a result of this lack of determination on juris-
diction, the transfer appears to only lengthen the time the litigants must
remain before the court before a final judgment may be rendered. Here
the withdrawal of the 12 (b) (2) motion forced the trial court to proceed
with a type of judicial administration that may lack the very efficiency
that section 1404 (a) strives to achieve."' Federal caselaw indicates that the
mere presence of corporate personnel within a state will not serve as a basis
for jurisdiction over the corporation.' Provided the contracts between
Lanseair and the New York companies were not consummated, this or
similar authority might have been utilized to decide the issue of in per-
sonat jurisdiction over Lanseair in the initial forum. Had the motion to
dismiss not been withdrawn, the time required to settle the issue of capacity
to bring suit could have been significantly reduced. On occasion it has been
argued that a transfer under 1404 (a) may be accomplished by a court
without personal jurisdiction; however, the Supreme Court has not yet
required motion. Because of he nature of the motion, any action taken to grant or deny the
transfer is within the discretion of the trial judge with mandamus the only remedy on appeal.
N.Y., Chicago, & St. Louis R.R. v. Vardaman, 181 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1950); 28 U.S.C. 1292(b)
(1958). In the instant case the appellate court specifically refused to grant such relief.
36l0 Av. Cas. 18,358 at 18,359 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
37 Unlike 28 U.S.C. 1406, section 1404(a) requires that all aspects of the federal jurisdiction
and venue statutes be met to allow transfer to a more convenient forum.
" Sue sponte motions are allowed in the application of the following rules by the district
courts: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g), 59(a), 60(a), 39(a), 39(c).
"'Note that "1404(a) has not deprived the court of power to dismiss where there is no other
federal court to which a transfer may be made." Gross v. Owens, 221 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
45 James-Diskinson Farm Mfg. Co. et al v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1926); Riverside & Dan
River v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1914); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
[Vol. 36
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interpreted the statute to so provide, and the argument has not been given
much credence. 1
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE ON TRANSFER
Because of Van Dusen it is recognized that the substantive law of the
original forum becomes the law of the case. However, Van Dusen does not
go so far as to apply the procedural law of the initial forum to the trans-
feree forum. As far as is possible, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
govern the action; however, the procedure for those areas not covered by
the Rules is the state law of the transferee forum. A South Carolina federal
court has said, "[i]n a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile
accident the lex loci would govern as to all matters that might be con-
sidered substantive and which created the right to sue, but, as to matters
that might be considered to be merely procedural, the lex fori would gov-
ern."' North Carolina case law has followed this line of reasoning! The
purpose for application of this logic is to remove the unnecessary burden of
applying unfamiliar procedure in the transferee court. Thus the only addi-
tional burden placed on the plaintiff in the transferee forum will be to
conform to those North Carolina rules of procedure" which are not within
the scope of the federal rules. Therefore, the transferee forum may utilize
rules which will affect the action, i.e., determine the competency and cred-
ibility of witnesses, relevancy of evidence, and burden of proof."3 Although
it may be argued that the plaintiff remains in a preferred position because
of the application of Van Dusen and the fact that federal rules override
state rules in all cases of conflicts of law,' it is still apparent that the party
opposing the transfer does in fact lose any advantage that may have accrued
to him as a result of procedural law applicable in the transferor forum. The
plaintiff implies that such a proposition may well confront him in the
North Carolina court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Van Dusen decided that the substantive law of
the initial forum with jurisdiction and proper venue is the law of the case
and will accompany any subsequent transfer of the action. If the question
of jurisdiction of the court is undecided, a transfer under section 1404 (a)
may still be made by the court; however, a finding of no jurisdiction will
bar the transfer. On procedural issues the transferee court will apply the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in reaching its decision. In the absence
4130 U. Chi. L. Rev. 735 (1963).
'Anderson v. Lane, 97 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.S.C. 1951); Taylor v. Reading Co., Inc., 23 F.R.D.
186 (E.D.Pa. 1958); Lewis v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 245 F.Supp. 195 (W.D.Mich.
1965).
' Lowe's No. Wilkesboro Hardware v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 206 F.Supp. 427
(M.D.N.C. 1962).
"N.C. Gen. Stat. Div. II Chap. 1-2.
U SAA v. Wharton, 237 F.Supp. 255 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
46lovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. den. 362 U.S. 949 (1960); Hope v.
Hearst Consol. Publication, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 956 (1962).
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of a Rule on the issue, the procedural law of the new forum will apply. If a
jurisdictional question is still pending, the transferee court must decide this
issue utilizing the law of the transferor court. In addition, the transferee
court must perfect its own jurisdiction under available "long-arm" statutes
if the action was transferred under the 1966 amendment to the general
venue statutes allowing transfer to the district "in which the claim arose."
The final action undertaken by these parties was in the Western District
of North Carolina. The court in that action reviewed the in personam
jurisdiction question with regard to Lanseair, and by applying New York
law, determined that the first court did not have jurisdiction over this
defendant. The trial court, therefore, lacked the power to include Lanseair
and Rapidair in the transfer to North Carolina. Because of this error, the
North Carolina court vacated the service of process on Lanseair and dis-
missed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the person; the result being
that the plaintiff failed to acquire the proper jurisdiction over Lanseair and
Rapidair and suffered a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1404 (a) is primarily concerned with efficient judicial administra-
tion and strives to further that end by allowing transfer of civil actions
to more convenient forums. To strengthen the purpose of 1404(a), liti-
gants, as well as trial courts, should make every attempt to provide answers
to any issues which might invalidate the power of a transferee forum to
render a final decision on the central issue contested. Unanswered issues
which may destroy the authority of the transferee court and force dismissal
have served not to elevate efficient administration of justice, but have
created only a greater burden for the entire judicial system.
Larry R. Boyd
[Vol. 3 6
